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 Rhetorical Pragmatism and Histories of New Media:
 Rorty on Kierkegaard on the Internet
 Steven Mailloux
 ABSTRACT
 This essay begins with Hubert Dreyfus's Kierkegaardian critique of the Internet and then
 turns to Richard Rorty's neo-pragmatist response, an unpublished text found in the Richard
 Rorty Papers. After considering these contrasting perspectives, the author proposes a third
 view, arguing that a rhetorical pragmatist should borrow from both Dreyfus's critique and
 Rorty's defense. The Internet does enable media users who are unthinkingly complacent in their
 passionate commitments as well as those who are complacently unthinking in their detached,
 everyday busyness. But the Internet also provides its own unique opportunities for thinking
 critically and for challenging complacency. After proposing this more rhetorically pragmatic
 view, the author discusses Rorty's published and unpublished comments on Kierkegaard more
 generally, concluding with Rorty's comparison of Kierkegaard and William James.
 I.
 Internet users "are demoralized in the shortest possible time on the largest
 possible scale, at the cheapest possible price." This judgment was actually ren-
 dered by S0ren Kierkegaard in the nineteenth-century about another new media,
 the penny press.1 But a recent interpreter of Kierkegaard, Hubert Dreyfus, asks
 that we consider these views expressed about the earlier mass media as imme-
 diately relevant to the dangers we face in the present. At the University of Co-
 penhagen in August 1998, Dreyfus read a paper entitled "Kierkegaard on the
 Internet: Anonymity vs. Commitment in the Present Age." A longtime friend and
 professional interlocutor, Richard Rorty wrote a brief response to that paper. I
 will examine these two texts- Dreyfus's now published essay and Rorty's unpub-
 lished comments- in order to better understand one contemporary version of the
 Pragmatist tradition and its relation to contrasting opinions about the rhetorical
 effects of new media.2
 Rorty had known Dreyfus since the late 1950s when he was at Wellesley Col-
 lege and Dreyfus at Harvard University. Rorty later claimed that he owed his
 acquaintance with European philosophy almost entirely to Dreyfus, and through
 many years their ongoing discussion and participation in colloquia helped bridge
 1 Kierkegaard, Journals , no. 489.
 2 An earlier version of this essay was delivered as a paper at the conference, "Time Will Tell,
 but Epistemology Won't: In Memory of Richard Rorty," at the University of California, Irvine
 on 14 May 2010.
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 the wide gap between European and Anglophone philosophies. Rorty fondly re-
 membered one of their joint ventures:
 Starting in 1980, Dreyfus [...] staged a series of summer institutes [at UC Berkeley],
 sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities. These brought Husserli-
 ans together with Searleans, Heideggerians together with Davisonians, Foucauldians
 together with bourgeois liberals. Some of the most fruitful teaching I have ever done,
 and some of the most instructive intellectual encounters I have ever had, were at these
 institutes. (Foreword xi)
 Teaching evaluations in the Richard Rorty Papers support his memories, at least
 from the students' point of view. With other instructors (Dreyfus, John Searle)
 receiving 3.7 and below on a scale with 4.0 as the highest score, the person sum-
 marizing the student evaluations felt it necessary to explain Rorty's average of
 4.03: Rorty received more A-pluses than A-minuses and was routinely praised for
 his ability to make very difficult material clear.3
 It is this ability- to make difficult thinking clear, to translate one piece of lan-
 guage into another usefully, profitably, pragmatically- that was one of Rorty's
 greatest rhetorical strengths. Redescription was a trope that Rorty used again
 and again, a philosophical strategy that played an important role in his rhetorical
 pragmatism as he applied it in his commentary on a wide range of cultural and
 philosophical topics, including the topic of new media as attacked by his friend
 Hubert Dreyfus. Dreyfus is, of course, the author of such influential books as
 What Computers Can't Do , a Heideggerian critique of artificial intelligence; Mi-
 chel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Phenomenology (1982), with Paul Rabi-
 nów, a book for which Rorty provided a press reader's report; Being-in-the-World
 (1991), a commentary on Division I of Heidegger's Being and Time , which also in-
 cludes some comments on Division II and Kierkegaard; and, most relevant to this
 essay, On the Internet (2001), published appropriately enough in the Routledge
 series called "Thinking in Action," which includes a revised version of Dreyfus's
 "Kierkegaard on the Internet," the paper to which Rorty responded.
 In what follows I will first present Dreyfus's Kierkegaardian criticisms of the
 Internet as new media and then consider Rorty's response to Dreyfus on Kierke-
 gaard on the Internet. I will conclude with some additional remarks on Rorty's in-
 terpretation of Kierkegaard and its connection to Rorty's take on William James's
 "The Will to Believe."
 II.
 A preliminary disclaimer: Rorty would not have called himself a rhetorical
 pragmatist. Indeed, he often avoided the term 'rhetoric' in reference both to rhet-
 oric as a field of study and to rhetoric as a useful concept. I once asked Rorty why
 someone with his interests in language, in conversation, in persuasive redescrip-
 3 Box 22, Folder 2, Richard Rorty Papers, MS-C017, Special Collections and Archives, The
 UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. Further references to this archive will be given in the
 following form: RRP box: folder.
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 tion, seemed so obviously to avoid using the term rhetoric. He answered simply
 that he did not want to reinstate a distinction between logic and rhetoric that
 Dewey, one of his masters, had so effectively and quite appropriately dismantled
 (Mailloux, Reception 33). We can find the same questioning of that distinction in
 Rorty's teaching notes archived in the Rorty Papers. His 1995 "Notes on Plato"
 contrast a Platonic notion that there is an ultimate "nature to goodness rather
 than just conventions about what counts as good conduct here or there" to "Drey-
 fus-like reasons" for thinking that we learn how to use words by "picking up con-
 ventions rather than recalling essences." Rorty then makes a list of the "binary
 oppositions of Western, Greek, metaphysics" that Heidegger and Derrida "will
 be trying to undermine." Rorty includes the usual suspects (usual, that is, from
 a Pragmatist and Post-Structuralist point of view): at the top of these question-
 able binaries is Knowledge/Opinion; later comes The True World/The Apparent
 World, Necessary/Contingent, Form/Matter, Soul/Body, Up/Down; and near the
 bottom of list, the suspect opposition Logic/Rhetoric.4
 So it is with some hesitation that I refer to Rorty as a rhetorical pragmatist. My
 pseudo-justification is that if we try to think our way around the Logic/Rheto-
 ric distinction and define rhetoric simply as the use of language in a context to
 have effects- effects that include persuasion and figuration- then Rorty's version
 of neo-pragmatism is rhetorical in that it clearly emphasizes the importance of
 language in our understanding of human being and defines language as a tool
 rather than a medium of representation or expression. For Rorty, language is an
 instrument for achieving our purposes in the world- an effective means for social
 interaction- rather than a medium that properly represents the intrinsic structure
 of nonhuman reality or that properly expresses the essential nature of the human
 species (cf. Rorty, Contingency , esp. 11-12, 41). Thus, just as one of his admirers,
 Cornel West, describes his own theory as prophetic pragmatism with its particu-
 lar emphasis on liberation, justice, and political theology, we might call Rorty's
 theory a kind of rhetorical pragmatism with its emphasis on redescription and
 democratic conversation.5
 In his paper, "Kierkegaard on the Internet," Dreyfus uses Kierkegaard's The
 Present Age to draw an analogy between an earlier period and our own. Kierke-
 gaard characterizes the mid-nineteenth century as a time of disinterested curios-
 ity that levels all values upon which action is based, and he blames the Public
 produced by the new media for this leveling process. "Even if my life had no other
 significance," he writes in his journal, "I am satisfied with having discovered the
 absolutely demoralizing existence of the daily press" (qtd. in Dreyfus, "Kierke-
 gaard" 97). Dreyfus remarks that it is no accident that Kierkegaard, writing in
 1846, chose the Public and the Press to attack. Summarizing Habermas's The
 4 "Notes on Plato," RRP, http://hdl.handle.net/10575/241 (accessed 1 Jan. 2014). Also, see
 Rorty, Take Care 70, where he accepts differences between good, sincere, or formally valid argu-
 ments and those that are bad, insincere, or formally invalid but sees no need for "an additional
 distinction between logic and rhetoric."
 5 See also Rorty's positive review of Ceccarelli's Shaping Science with Rhetoric in "Studied
 Ambiguity." For more on rhetorical pragmatism, see Mailloux, "Rhetorical Pragmatism"; Mail-
 loux, "Euro-American"; and Mailloux and Gilyard.
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 Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere , Dreyfus gives a brief media his-
 tory of the Enlightenment creation of a Public Sphere "as a space in which the
 rational, disinterested reflection that should guide government and human life
 could be institutionalized and refined" (98) and, quoting Habermas, notes how
 an expanding daily press extended the public debate to more and more ordinary
 citizens until by the middle of the nineteenth century "'the reign of public opinion
 appeared as the reign of the many and mediocre'" (99).
 But Kierkegaard's chief concern was not the media's encouragement of me-
 diocrity, nor the "merging of the individual with the group," nor the mass con-
 formity of "the crowd" (99). Dreyfus claims that Kierkegaard's originality was in
 seeing the Public Sphere itself "as a new and dangerous cultural phenomenon in
 which the leveling produced by the Press brings out something that was deeply
 wrong with the Enlightenment idea of detached reflection from the start" (99).
 Dreyfus clarifies how for Kierkegaard the new media produced this leveling in
 several interrelated ways.
 In redescribing Kierkegaard's media critique using his own version of an early-
 Heideggerian vocabulary, Dreyfus explains:
 the new massive distribution of desituated information was making every sort of infor-
 mation immediately available to anyone, thereby producing a desituated, detached spec-
 tator. The new power of the Press to disseminate information to everyone in a nation led
 its readers to transcend their local, personal involvement and [. . .] encouraged everyone
 to develop an opinion about everything. (100)
 Habermas views this development as "a triumph of democratization," but Kier-
 kegaard "saw that the Public Sphere was destined to become a realm of idle talk
 in which spectators merely pass the word along" (100). From this Heideggerian-
 inflected Kierkegaardian perspective, the media-produced Public Sphere appears
 to promote "ubiquitous commentators who deliberately detach themselves from
 the local practices out of which specific issues grow and in terms of which these
 issues must be resolved through some sort of committed action. What seems a
 virtue to detached Enlightenment reason, therefore, looks like a disastrous draw-
 back to Kierkegaard." The Public Sphere becomes "a world in which everyone
 has an opinion on, and comments on, all public matters without needing any first-
 hand experience and without having or wanting any responsibility" (100).
 Worst of all, according to Dreyfus's Kierkegaard, in this media-produced Pub-
 lic Sphere "anyone can hold an opinion on anything without having to act on it,"
 and this situation results in "the possibility of endless reflection" with "no possi-
 bility of decision and action," no possibility of the kind of unconditional commit-
 ment that makes life meaningful. Thus, Dreyfus quotes the passage from Kierke-
 gaard's journal with which I began: "Here men are demoralized in the shortest
 possible time on the largest possible scale, at the cheapest possible price" (101).
 And then Dreyfus makes explicit the analogy between Kierkegaard's media world
 and today's, writing of Habermas's idealized Public Sphere:
 The desituated and anonymous press and the lack of passion or commitment in our re-
 flective age combine to produce the Public, the agent of the nihilistic leveling charac-
 teristic of his time and ours. [. . .] Kierkegaard would surely have seen in the Internet,
 with its web sites full of anonymous information from all over the world and its interest
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 groups which anyone in the world can join and where one can discuss any topic endlessly
 without consequences, the hi-tech synthesis of the worst features of the newspaper and
 the coffee house. (101-02)
 Dreyfus then goes on to expand on this pessimistic Kierkegaardian vision of new
 media by explaining how Kierkegaard's three-stage model of development (aes-
 thetic, ethical, and religious) can be used to specify further the dangers of the
 Internet. But now I want to move on to Rorty's response to Dreyfus, so let me just
 give Dreyfus's conclusion: "So it looks like Kierkegaard may be right. The press
 and the Internet are the ultimate enemy of unconditional commitment, but only
 the unconditional commitment of what Kierkegaard calls the religious sphere of
 existence can save us from the nihilistic leveling launched by the Enlightenment,
 promoted by the press and the public sphere, and perfected in the World Wide
 Web."6
 Rorty begins his response to Dreyfus in typical rhetorical pragmatist fashion
 by citing some books that have had effects on their readers who have then used
 them for various purposes. He says:
 Bert Dreyfus and I admire many of the same authors, in particular Heidegger and Kier-
 kegaard. But we differ about the use to which they can be put. Most of us Heidegger-
 freaks read him the way Christians pray, Zen Buddhists meditate, Janeites reread Per-
 suasion , or Shakespearians rehearse the sonnets. We treat Heidegger as an author who
 helps us toward something like spiritual or imaginative perfection. It does not occur to
 us that he might be used for public purposes. Writers like Nietzsche, Heidegger, and
 Kierkegaard, we believe, were not at their best when commenting on current events or
 public policy.
 In contrast, Dreyfus "reads these philosophers differently," having "once, fa-
 mously, organized a conference on 'Applied Heidegger'" and now, in the pres-
 ent paper, using Kierkegaard to offer "advice on the problems of our own day"
 (Rorty, "Comments").
 Behind the contrast Rorty draws here is his well known distinction, argued
 most fully a decade earlier in Contingency, Irony , and Solidarity , a distinction
 between authors "in whom the desire for self-creation, for private autonomy,
 dominates" versus authors "in whom the desire for a more just and free human
 community dominates." Rorty mentions Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger
 among the former as useful exemplars, "as illustrations of what private perfec-
 tion-a self-created, autonomous, human life- can be like"; and he lists Marx,
 Dewey, and Habermas as "fellow citizens" who "are engaged in a shared, social
 effort- the effort to make our institutions and practices more just and less cruel."
 Rorty argues further that it is usually a mistake to try to mix these two very differ-
 ent human activities. Theoretically or philosophically, it is impossible, he writes,
 to come up with a comprehensive outlook that lets "us hold self-creation and jus-
 6 These are actually the concluding words of the paper as slightly revised and published in
 Dreyfus, On the Internet 88-89. The paper in its original published form ends more definitively-
 "Thus Kierkegaard is right"- but less expansively, referring only to the "leveling launched by
 the Enlightenment and perfected in the Press and the Public Sphere" with no final reference to
 the Internet (Dreyfus, "Kierkegaard" 109).
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 tice, private perfection and human solidarity, in a single vision." And practically
 or socio-politically, it is better not to mix the vocabularies of the two different
 kinds of tasks, as the "vocabulary of self-creation is necessarily private, unshared,
 unsuited to argument. The vocabulary of justice is necessarily public and shared,
 a medium for argumentative exchange" (Rorty, Contingency xiii-xiv).
 But it is not just on liberal principle that Rorty objects to a private Kierke-
 gaardian vocabulary being put to purposes of public critique. More to his immedi-
 ate point, Rorty doubts that Kierkegaard's analysis of the Public and new media
 is usefully applicable to either his time or ours. Rorty says he is "particularly
 dubious" about using the text Dreyfus relies on in his paper, Kierkegaard's The
 Present Age, which Rorty characterizes as "Kierkegaard at his crankiest" and
 "a big come-down from books like [Kierkegaard's] Philosophical Fragments and
 Concluding Unscientific Postscript " (Rorty, "Comments").
 Rorty provides a very different history of the new media and politics in Kier-
 kegaard's time:
 You would never guess from reading [Kierkegaard's] The Present Age that it was writ-
 ten in a period when representative government was really beginning to get a grip on
 Europe, when movements for the expansion of the franchise were frequent and often
 successful, and when increased literacy was both a cause and an effect of the success of
 the penny press. It is hard to imagine the development of mass democracy without the
 sort of popular press which grew up in the [nineteenth] century.
 Rorty grants that Kierkegaard, along with other "great political and literary fig-
 ures," were "savaged by the press," but adds that Kierkegaard's The Present Age
 seems to him "not much more than an ill-tempered reaction to being baited by
 one's inferiors."
 Turning to views of the Internet, Rorty declares that "the triviality of the chat
 rooms and the mindless proliferation of websites are a small price to pay for the
 political opportunities which the net offers. We in the rich old democracies, who
 are accustomed to intellectual freedom, may not appreciate what the net can do
 for people in places like Peru and Kazakhstan." He goes on to recommend that
 funds spent on UNESCO "and on shipping people like [him] to international con-
 ferences" should "be spent on fiber optic cables providing internet connections
 between every educational institution in the world, starting with the universities
 and proceeding down to the primary schools." This would lead to more public
 transparency, easier whistle-blowing of hidden governmental abominations, and
 more accessible education for poor children. Indeed, according to Rorty, "a lot of
 wonderful things would happen. The internet could be for the development of an
 international political class what the penny press was for the widening of this class
 in nineteenth century Europe."
 Getting to the specifics of Dreyfus's paper, Rorty grants that the views of the
 Internet Dreyfus puts into Kierkegaard's mouth are true enough "but fairly in-
 consequential." Dreyfus "does point out all the disadvantages of the net" Rorty
 admits, but then he adds in typical pragmatist fashion that the advantages, the
 beneficial consequences, of the Internet clearly outweigh the disadvantages "just
 as they did in the case of the scurrilous, muck-raking, redneck, penny press."
 Rorty gives as a representative example the fact that "the net is a perfect medium
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 for slander and innuendo," but he notes that such statements are "like saying that
 money is a perfect medium for fraud and theft. So it is, but a money economy is
 still clearly better than a barter economy. Any medium of exchange of informa-
 tion will be put to slanderous purposes, but we are still better off with cheaper and
 more fluid media than without them."
 Addressing Dreyfus's use of Kierkegaard's three-stage model of self-develop-
 ment (the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious), Rorty makes his usual point
 that such development relates more to private life than public politics and adds
 that it is probably only applicable anyway to "intellectuals who read large num-
 bers of books." Rorty does not see a general problem with the new media's level-
 ing process leading to endless reflection and the impossibility of passionate com-
 mitment to action: "I am not sure that paralyzing self-scrutiny is a big problem for
 more than a few intellectuals. I find it hard to imagine that the incidence of this
 problem will be increased by the internet."
 Wrapping up his remarks, Rorty quotes a statement from Dreyfus's paper that
 does not appear in any of its published versions. Dreyfus says that "it should be
 the job of information technology to look for structures that solicit and support
 unconditional commitments and implement them." Rorty thinks such statements
 smack of the Orwellian world of loving Big Brother. He would just as soon have
 information technologists stay out of the unconditional commitment business, no
 matter how attractive Kierkegaard and Nietzsche might make such commitments
 sound. Rorty concludes, "I would prefer it if the information technologists just put
 everything they could think of on the net- rigorously hierarchical organized data
 bases, hypertexts, the complete works of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, programs
 that teach you symbolic logic and Danish and test your progress, and so on. They
 could just let us surfers take it from there."
 In response to Dreyfus's and Rorty's contrasting evaluations of the Internet, I
 suggest a different view, one that borrows a bit from each of theirs. What seems most
 striking today is that so many media users are either unthinkingly complacent in
 their passionate commitments or complacently unthinking in their detached, every-
 day busy-ness. Examples of the former are religious and secular dogmatic funda-
 mentalists, unthinkingly complacent in their passionate commitments. Examples of
 the latter are most of the rest of us in our busy professional and personal, public, and
 private lives. The Internet does encourage both ways of being unthinking and com-
 placent. I have in mind, on the one hand, the partisan, self-validating websites and
 blog discussions of fundamentalists on the right and left, religious and secular; and
 then, on the other hand, everyone's time-consuming activities of checking emails,
 web-surfing, and information overloading. But it is also the case that the Internet
 provides its own unique opportunities for challenging unthinking complacency. Af-
 ter all, I retrieved Dreyfus's essay on Kierkegaard first from his website, and Rorty's
 digital archive online was my source for his critique of Dreyfus. Arguably both texts
 are opportunities for thinking through our complacencies in reference to new media.
 These opportunities include the models they provide for thinking rhetorically about
 media history. Dreyfus and Rorty demonstrate how arguments proposing different
 accounts of new media in the past help in thinking about media in the present and,
 indeed, might even motivate different self-reflective uses of that media in the future.
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 III.
 As an epilogue to these comments, I would like to note briefly some related
 points about Rorty and Kierkegaard that emerge from the texts now available in
 the Richard Rorty Papers. I have indicated how Rorty, while agreeing with some
 of Dreyfus's descriptions of the Internet, ultimately disagrees with Dreyfus's
 Kierkegaardian condemnation of that media. But, we might ask, does Rorty fully
 agree with Dreyfus's positive evaluation of Kierkegaard's philosophy independent
 of its application in assessing new media? And how does Rorty's interpretation of
 Kierkegaard relate more generally to his rhetorical pragmatism?
 In answering these questions, we receive some help from Rorty's published
 work. Though there is little sustained discussion of Kierkegaard in Rorty's books
 and articles, the Danish philosopher is often mentioned in passing to illustrate
 this or that Rortian generalization about the history of philosophy. For example,
 in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty lists Kierkegaard among his edi-
 fying as opposed to systematic philosophers (369), and more than once Rorty
 cites his "favorite remark of Kierkegaard's about Hegel" ("Response" 221n2).
 He puts it this way in "Philosophy as a Transitional Genre": "The verdict of the
 literary culture on this [Hegelian] metaphysics was nicely formulated by Kier-
 kegaard when he said that if Hegel had written at the end of his books that 'this
 was all just a thought experiment' he would have been the greatest thinker who
 ever lived, but that, as it was, he was merely a buffoon" (96). Rorty comments
 that Kierkegaard's "epithet is too harsh, but the spirit of the remark seems right"
 ("Response" 221n2).
 Such passing references to Kierkegaard in Rorty's published works do not help
 much with my questions about how Rorty agrees with Dreyfus's evaluation of
 Kierkegaard or how Rorty's interpretation relates to his neo-pragmatism. But if
 we look at unpublished texts in the Rorty Papers, I think the answers become
 clearer.7
 According to syllabi and lecture notes, Rorty included Kierkegaard in his
 courses as early as 1960 during his last year teaching at Wellesley (see RRP 51:7).
 Later in his career and more helpful, however, are the notes for Rorty's lectures
 on Kierkegaard for a fall 1987 Philosophy 518 course at the University of Virginia.
 In his first Kierkegaard lecture Rorty remarks that both Kierkegaard and Nietz-
 sche were "illustrative of the way in which philosophical system-building died
 with Hegel and was replaced by artistic [. . .] innovation" (as well as by the politi-
 cal innovations of philosophers like Mill and Marx). Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
 were two "private eccentrics" who "are comparable in being [...] anti-Hegelian
 and trying to find ways of saying that passion ranks above thought, reflection on
 the situation of the individual over world history." Though Kierkegaard "adored"
 Christianity and Nietzsche "loathed" it, "both agreed that Hegel had not under-
 stood [Christianity] properly" (RRP 43:18, "First S.K. lecture" 1).
 7 For other studies examining the philosophies of Kierkegaard and Rorty, see Rudd, Visker,
 Frazier, and Simmons.
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 Rorty turns to Concluding Unscientific Postscript , in which Kierkegaard ar-
 gued that
 [a]ll decisiveness, all essential decisiveness, is rooted in subjectivity. A contemplative
 spirit, and this is what the objective subject is, feels nowhere any infinite need of a deci-
 sion, and sees no decision anywhere. This is th efalsum that is inherent in all objectivity;
 and this is the significance of mediation as the mode of transition in the continuous
 process, where nothing is fixed and where nothing is infinitely decided. (Kierkegaard,
 Concluding 33)
 Rorty quotes from a long footnote to this last sentence as his first example of
 Kierkegaardian "digs at Hegel": "The great secret of the [Hegelian] System [. . .]
 is pretty much the same as the sophism of Protagoras, that everything is relative;
 except that here, everything is relative in the continuing world-process. But this
 cannot help any living individual." Kierkegaard goes on to cite an anecdote from
 Plutarch's Moralia about a philosopher described to a visitor as "a wise man [. . .]
 occupied in the search for virtue," to which the visitor responds: "But when does
 he then propose to use it?" (Kierkegaard, Concluding 34n; emphasis mine).8
 Next Rorty quotes Kierkegaard's statement that "The philosopher contem-
 plates Christianity [only] for the sake of interpenetrating it with his speculative
 thought," which Rorty glosses as Kierkegaard saying that "Hegel takes Christi-
 anity as a datum, not as an option [...]; for Hegel, the question of 'how am I to
 live, what should I do?' is put aside in favor of 'Where is history going?"' ("First
 S.K. lecture" 1-2). Thus, Rorty sees Kierkegaard as opposing objective, system-
 atic thought, which merely arranges abstract possibilities, to subjective, passionate
 thought, which embodies actual commitments and enables decisions to act. Rorty
 relates this Kierkegaardian philosophy to his own Pragmatism when, in summary,
 he cites William James (in "The Will to Believe") and claims that "when we face
 a 4 live , momentous and forced option ' [...] the way in which abstract possibilities
 hang together is not [of much] help" (2).
 Later in a published, full-blown treatment of James's essay, Rorty expands on
 his Kierkegaardian point that private 'subjective' commitment requires no public
 'objective' justification. He writes, "It is a consequence of James's utilitarian view
 of the nature of obligation that the obligation to justify one's beliefs arises only
 when one's habits of action interfere with the fulfillment of others' needs. Insofar
 as one is engaged in a private project, that obligation lapses" (Rorty, "Religious"
 85). James resisted the view that "to be rational" means submitting all one's be-
 liefs "to the judgment of one's peers." Instead, James argues in "The Will to Be-
 lieve" that "there are live, momentous, and forced options which cannot be de-
 cided by evidence- cannot, as James put it, 'be decided on intellectual grounds.'"
 Rorty criticizes James here for assuming a too rigid distinction between intellect
 and passion, claiming that it is exactly this "sort of dualism which James needs to
 blur" as a Pragmatist who maintains that "the only point of having beliefs in the
 first place is to gratify desires" (88). But Rorty tries to "reinterpret James's intel-
 lect/passion distinction so as to make it coincide with a distinction between what
 8 The note is partly quoted by Rorty, "First S. K. lecture" 1.
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 needs justification to other human beings and what does not" (89). Rorty gives
 Kierkegaard's faith in the Incarnation as a paradigmantic case of unjustifiable
 belief, noting that Kierkegaard sees no need to explain to others "how Christ can
 be both mortal and immortal" (95). In such ways, Rorty aligns James with Kierke-
 gaard in viewing both as being in the business of privatizing religion.
 However, privatizing religion does not mean that religious beliefs have no ef-
 fect on public actions. According to Kierkegaard, just the opposite is the case.
 Such beliefs provide the ultimate commitments upon which decisions to act are
 made. As Rorty notes, for Kierkegaard these passionately-held commitments,
 rather than abstract systems, constitute the grounds for deciding among live, mo-
 mentous, and forced options.9 And here we see a direct connection with Kierke-
 gaard's decisionist views as applied in criticizing the new media of his time. In-
 deed, Rorty's lectures quote some of the same Kierkegaardian words that Dreyfus
 applies in his critique of the Internet: "Demoralized by too assiduous an absorp-
 tion in [abstract Hegelian] world-historical considerations, people no longer have
 any will for anything" ("First S.K. lecture" 2).
 So, Rorty does seem to agree with Dreyfus's interpretation of Kierkegaard, at
 least with those aspects of Kierkegaardian thought most relevant to the demor-
 alizing media-effects of leveling and inaction. But Rorty disagrees that Kierke-
 gaard, so interpreted, actually applies to current media in a way that justifies a
 condemnation of the Internet. That is, for Rorty as a rhetorical pragmatist, it is
 not the case that with the new media, people "are demoralized in the shortest pos-
 sible time on the largest possible scale at the cheapest possible price."
 9 Thus, Kierkegaard stands as one of those Christians who successfully integrate (what
 Rorty calls) private and public final vocabularies, vocabularies that Rorty goes great lengths to
 keep separate. "For a few such people- Christians (and others) for whom the search for private
 perfection coincides with the project of living for others- the two sorts of questions come to-
 gether. For most such, they do not" (Rorty, Contingency 143).
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